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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  




Once upon a time in Russia, when Boris Yel'tsin was president and setting tanks 
on the parliament was not condemned as "antidemocratic," political, and 
specifically electoral, campaigns were waged last in public; the initial salvoes 
sounded in the corridors of the few money-making industries of the Yel'tsin-era 
(quite literally in the 1996 struggle for control of Rosvooruzhenie, whose 
chairman "got the message" and resigned after an unexploded bomb was found 
in the hall just outside his office).  Then, as now, recent re-election had rendered 
the President a theoretical lame duck, and potential contenders jockeyed for 
position over critical issues, such as the financial wherewithal to campaign 
effectively and, of course, access to the media. 
 
Then, a clan emerged from the Yel'tsin camp and was called "The Family," as a 
reference to the unusual role played by the President's daughter.  Now, the 
Kremlin, the remnants of The Family, and various bureaucratic groups each have 
their own clan, and in some cases ideology, and are competing for spoils in a re-
division of assets.  Most of the media (if you will pardon the pun), have been 
sucked into the Kremlin orbit; there are however a few, generally small, 
exceptions (such as Ekho Moskvy). 
 
There was a minor, independent, not particularly liberal but non-governmental, 
television station left in the public orbit.  That is, of course, until last month, when 
a blackout in Moscow caught Anatoli Chubais in the crosshairs for a second time 
this year, Chubais "got the message" and his company, RAO UES sold its 
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interest in REN-TV to the state-owned (and more specifically, Kremlin apparat-
run) Gazprom.  (For more on the blackout and its fall-out, see Russian 
Legislative and Domestic Affairs below).  Chubais, who served as regent during 
President Yel'tsin's long hospitalization prior to and following his heart surgery in 
1996, was a comfortable, perhaps even founding member of the Family.  
Throughout Putin's reign however, Chubais has walked a tenuous tightrope 
between clans. (1)  The assassination attempt and the blackout can both be seen 
as messages meant to concentrate his attention.  
 
While a recent regular RAO UES Board of Directors meeting confirmed Chubais 
as President of the electrical systems company and solidified his control through 
the confirmation of his hand-picked team as board members, the sale of REN-TV 
to a Kremlin clan/Putin ally, Aleksei Mordashov (Northern Steel) suggests 
Chubais' continuing presence at RAO UES had a price.  (2)  And REN-TV might 
not have constituted the whole of the cost:  The electric company's agreement 
this week to finish the Boguchany hydro-power project and aluminum smelter 
with oligarch du jour Oleg Deripasko (in fairness, Deripasko has been with Putin 
for years) also raises questions of the quid pro quo.  (3)  And should Chubais 
appear among western political and financial leaders earnestly explaining the 
necessity of amending the constitution to keep Putin in power, or lobbying for 
support for a hand-picked Kremlin successor in the face of a nationalist, perhaps 
even quasi-fascist opposition threat, remember the bargain he evidently had to 
make this summer—and be thankful that the parliament has only been turned 
into a rubber stamp, and not a smoldering stump. 
 
Gazprom and the state 
Dmitri Medvedev might just be the dark horse candidate for President in 2008.  
As Chair of Gazprom and head of the Kremlin Administration, he wields 
tremendous power in relative quiet.  Control of substantial financial assets 
coupled with proximity to the Kremlin inner circle clearly are still reliable 
indicators of both current political clout and future ambitions; the government's 
 3 
recent acquisition of a controlling stake in Russia's gas conglomerate makes 
Medvedev, and his clan, a potent force in the upcoming political stakes. (4) 
 
Security Council's full agenda 
The Security Council (SC) occupies an unusual place in Russia's constitutional 
order:  the description of its role leaves enough room for interpretation to allow it 
to function, at times, as little more than a talking shop with rare regular meetings.  
Under forceful, and usually well-connected leadership, the Security Council has 
brought together the Kremlin's top players in decisions that can have the force of 
law. 
 
Currently, the Security Council meetings have been regular, frequent, and 
covering a broad range of issues:  On 28 June, the SC met to discuss military 
reform (5); on 2 July, the SC took to the road, meeting in Kaliningrad as part of 
the city's 750th founding celebration, to discuss the role of Russia's regions in 
achieving "social and economic development goals" (6); and on 9 July, Putin 
"had a conference with members of the Security Council" to discuss migration 
policy. (7) 
 
The natural curiosity arising from this flurry of SC activity focuses on the policy, 
action, or results attributable to Security Council decisions.  While little tangible 
effect has appeared as yet, the Secretary of the Council, um, ah yes, Igor Ivanov, 




(1) Current clan nomenclature, "liberal," "St. Petersburger," siloviki," etc. seems 
woefully inadequate to address the web of regional, professional and financial 
ties that bind the current power elite. 
(2) Aleksandra Samarina, The Price of the Top Job at RAO Unified Energy 
Systems, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 Jul 05, p. 2 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(3) Yulia Latynina, 2008 and the Lesser of Two Evils, Moscow Times, 6 Jul 05 via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Moscow News, 29 Jun 05 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(5) "Introductory remarks at the Security Council session," President Putin, 28 
Jun 05 via www.kremlin.ru. 
(6) "Introductory remarks at the Security Council session," President Putin, 2 Jul 
05 via www.kremlin.ru. 
(7) Itar-Tass, 9 Jul 05 via Lexis-Nexis.  Interestingly, the SC Secretary was listed 
third among SC members present at this session.  In specifying discussion of 
migration policy, this Itar-Tass report also noted that Presidential Aid Viktor 
Ivanov and First Deputy Minister Aleksandr Chekalin,specifically, were involved 
on this topic. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Maolmordha McGowan 
 
The people vs. Nur-Pashi Kulayev 
From the moment he entered the courtroom in Vladikavkaz on May 31, Nur-
Pashi Kulayev was confronted by throngs of belligerent mothers chanting "you 
should be killed and your body thrown to the pigs." (1) It must have been quite 
uncomfortable for Kulayev, the sole (official) surviving terrorist of the September 
1-3, 2004 Beslan siege. Perhaps not as uncomfortable as when he was dragged 
out from under a truck, beaten and arrested by masked men (just a short 
distance from where 31 of his compatriots and 330 civilians were massacred in a 
bloodbath pointless from every point of view) but still quite uncomfortable. 
 
Unfortunately for the Kremlin, in this show trial not everything is going according 
to the script. The relatives of the deceased are proving to be quite difficult to 
please, and Kulayev is not playing the villain as they would have liked. 
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Public anger has been brewing as witnesses and Kulayev have given testimony 
that contradicts the official line of the FSB and the prosecutor general's office. 
The official parliamentary investigation shows no signs of producing answers 
either; one member of the committee has already admitted that the question the 
families of the victims want answered, namely, who is responsible for the deaths 
of their children, "is the question our commission probably won't be able to 
answer." (2) 
 
In lieu of the truth, someone in Moscow must have convinced the President that 
satisfying the families' lust for revenge by parading Kulayev through court would 
provide sufficient closure. There was little to stop Putin from keeping Kulayev in 
legal limbo indefinitely. Clearly, the Kremlin thought it more advantageous to 
prosecute, convict, and officially imprison Kulayev than to allow him to languish 
indefinitely. 
 
Not surprisingly, many of the victim's families have seen through the façade. 
Zalina Guburova, whose 10 year old son was shot in the head, declared that 
"prosecuting Kulayev was like throwing us a bone, as if to a dog." (3) "They've 
dumped the blame onto this one man; they've found a scapegoat," said another 
voice from the crowd of relatives and witnesses in the courtroom on June 15. The 
fake trial of the People vs. Nur-Pashi Kulayev is quickly devolving into a very real 
trial of the People vs. the Kremlin, the FSB and the MVD. Kulayev himself has 
become little more than a footnote in the text. 
 
What is remarkable is the degree of pity shown for Kulayev, perhaps out of sheer 
indignation at the lack of government transparency in the case. In a series of 
surprises in late June, relatives of the victims, among them the outraged and 
outspoken Committee of Beslan Mothers, turned on the prosecutors at the 
Vladikavkaz courtroom. Committee head Susanna Dudiyeva, addressing Kulayev 
directly, promised that "if you tell the truth, we are ready to appeal for a pardon 
for you." (4)  
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How awkward for federal prosecutor Maria Semisynova! Unfazed, however, she 
replied sarcastically that perhaps Kulayev's status should be changed from 
defendant to victim. (5) 
 
"We need him to tell the truthŠ We need to be confident he won't die of a heart 
attack or fall down the stairs," Dudiyeva continued, appealing for protection of the 
defendant. Semisynova tried to regain control of the crowd, reminding them just 
who had detonated the bombs in the school, which ultimately killed most of the 
civilians. "Were these people not terrorists?" she asked. (6) 
 
They were, but that's not the point. 
 
The point, as far as these relatives are now concerned, is that no one in the 
government or the security services is being held accountable for the botched 
rescue operation. Dudiyeva put it in simple terms; "What we want to see is the 
heads of the security and law enforcement agencies on trial." (7) 
 
In a sign that things are spiraling out of the Kremlin's control, a witness who was 
preparing to give evidence that contradicted the FSB's narrative told the court 
that he had been approached at night by unidentified agents, and ordered to 
"shut up, or be killed." (8) 
 
Anatomy of an FSB failure 
A devastating lack of coordination on the part of the supposed rescuers at Beslan 
is supposedly one of the issues being addressed by a parliamentary commission, 
due to report in October. For a day and a half after the start of the siege, the 
security forces of the President of North Ossetia, the regional division of the 
MVD, the regional directorate of the FSB and the 58th army division were all 
conducting separate operations in the area around the school. (9) 
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Two FSB counter-terrorism "experts" were dispatched to Beslan from Moscow to 
help manage the situation. FSB Deputy Director Vladimir Anisinov and first 
Deputy Director General Vladimir Pronichev arrived on the scene at noon on the 
second day of the crisis. (10) General Pronichev previously had commanded the 
"rescue operation" in the 2002 seizure of the Dubrovka Theatre (Nord-Ost), in 
which 170 civilians were killed. 
 
After their arrival, the two presented North Ossetian President Dzasokhov with an 
order from Prime Minister Fradkov which placed Valeri Andreev, the regional 
FSB commander, in charge of the crisis at a joint headquarters. According to 
Russian law, a headquarters should have been set up as soon as possible, so it 
is unclear why this process took a day and a half. Not necessarily surprising, but 
still unclear. (11) 
 
It has since come to light that Pronichev and Anisimov were themselves in 
control of the operation, though they operated from a separate headquarters 
staffed by officials from Moscow, to which the local FSB had little access. It now 
seems clear that Andreev was only nominally in command, but available to serve 
as scapegoat when operations went awry. 
 
In the aftermath of the debacle, Andreev was removed from his post, but 
remained on active duty. (12) Dzasokhov was the subject of repeated protests in 
the wake of Beslan, and eventually resigned for supposedly unrelated reasons. 
Interestingly, Anisimov was quietly transferred to the active reserve just a few 
weeks ago. Almost no information has surfaced about the Anisimov transfer, and 
it is difficult to tell if it was with his consent. (13) 
 
Prosecution or promotion? 
What makes Anisimov's retirement interesting is his close association with 
Nikolai Patrushev. He was promoted to his current rank in Patrushev's wake, and 
was long assumed to be one of "his people." Anisimov served with Pronichev in 
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the Karelian MGB, and the two are longtime associates. It is unclear whether 
Anisimov's departure was caused by his performance at Beslan. 
 
Patrushev lost an associate, but does that mean that things bode ill for him? His 
tenure of six years has been quite long by FSB standards and has been 
characterized by numerous failures. Of course, his record is less critical than his 
relationship with Putin. It is nearly inconceivable that he would be removed for 
disciplinary reasons, as long as he retains the President's trust. Rumors that 
Patrushev would leave the FSB to become deputy prime minister surfaced in 
2004, with Pronichev among those seen as possible successors. This talk has 
subsided of late; Patrushev's record at the FSB may have made him a political 
liability from the Kremlin's viewpoint, and eyes already are turning towards the 
2008 election (coronation?). (14) 
 
Novaya gazeta reported on June 30 that there were rumors that Patrushev would 
be replaced by Rosoboroneksport Director General Sergei Chemezov within 
days. This has not transpired, though it may have led some observers 
prematurely to speak of "former FSB director Nikolai Patrushev, now a State 
Duma deputy." (15) But on a presidential visit to Dagestan just days ago, 
Patrushev and Pronichev accompanied Putin. (16) 
 
Fighting off the angry mothers' revolution 
If Patrushev stays on at the FSB, he should not anticipate ridding himself of the 
Beslan mothers any time soon. The Beslan mothers' desire for the blood of the 
FSB and MVD was in no way sated by the retirement of Anisimov, the 
resignation of Dzasokhov or the reassignment of Andreev. "Our search for the 
truth will continue until the day we die," said Guburova on June 24. (17) 
 
Bowing to pressure from the mothers and others, Deputy Prosecutor General 
Nikolai Shepel publicly mentioned the possibility of FSB and MVD leaders being 
prosecuted, promising that "the role of each of them will be considered." He did 
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not elaborate on whether he was referring to regional or senior security service 
officials. (18) 
 
The actual likelihood of dismissals is low; however, the fact that such a 
development would even be suggested publicly by a senior prosecutor indicates 
that Moscow might be feeling compelled to hold someone accountable for the 
handling of the botched rescue operations. In addition to the families, the 
government of North Ossetia is determined to serve its constituents by finding 
the truth, before it gets buried. 
 
The local investigation has refused to share information with the federal 
authorities and is considered illegitimate by Shepel, probably because it has 
come up with a laundry list of possible falsehoods in the official FSB/Prosecutor-
General storyline. Rather, the list more closely reflects the testimony of Kulayev 
and some of the survivors, including: 
 
• That a list of the terrorists' demands was received by the FSB; 
• That the army used tanks and flame throwers in storming the building, 
which was the primary cause of the fire which killed many hostages; 
• That there were significantly more terrorists than the government's number 
of 32, and that many of these escaped; 
• That the terrorists hid most of their weapons in the school, then retrieved 
them after entering the building. (19) 
 
The result of these revelations has driven the mothers to apply to the Prosecutor-
General's office for criminal cases against Patrushev, Pronichev, Anisimov, 
Andreev and MVD head Rashid Nurgaliev. (20) Thus, it might be a advisable for 
Patrushev to stay atop his perch, where he will have the power to diffuse the 




As if to guarantee that history will continue to repeat itself, as Kulayev stood trial 
in Vladikavkaz, NTV Mir showed a story about an anti-terrorism exercise in which 
the FSB was  proud to announce that "the terrorists have been captured and 





(1) Yana Voitova, The Moscow Times, 17 Jun 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Viktor Khamraev, Kommersant-Vlast, 20 Jun 05; What the Papers Say via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) Tom Parfitt, The Observer, 26 Jun 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Voitova, ibid. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Parfitt, The Observer, 26 Jun 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) Ibid. 




(12) Nabi Abdullaev, The Moscow Times, 15 Apr 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) Roman Shleinov, Novaya gazeta, 30 Jun 2005; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(14) Konstantin Demchenko, Russkii kurier, 22 Sep 04; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 15 Jul 05 via 
http://www.rferl.org/reports/caucasus-report/2005/07/23-150705.asp. 
(16) Anatoly Medetsky, The Moscow Times, 18 Jul 2005 via 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/07/18/001.html 
(17) Parfitt, The Observer, 26 Jun 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(18) Ibid. 
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(19) Olga Allenova, Kommersant, 20 Jun 05 via 
http://www.kommersant.com/doc.asp?id_doc=585982. 
(20) Kommersant, 22 Jun 05 via 
http://www.kommersant.com/doc.asp?id_doc=586367. 
(21) NTV Mir, 1100 GMT, 3 Jun 05; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
Values for tomorrow's world? 
Within the last month, Russia has attempted increasingly to demonstrate a strong 
relationship with the "eastern vector" of Russian foreign policy, specifically China.  
This was clearly on display during the Moscow-Beijing summit between Russian 
President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao, late in June, and also 
throughout the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) July summit 
in Astana. Clearly, Moscow's increasing rapprochement with China in terms of 
geopolitics, trade, and "common values" indicates a desire for an alignment that 
would propel Russia into a stronger international position, one that is directed 
less towards the West and more towards Asia. Konstantin Pulikovskiy, Russian 
Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern District, said as much: "The E.U. does not 
exactly like Russia. They are doing everything to lower Russia's profile or its 
influence on European issues. This is why it is very important that in the East, in 
Asia, we have a friendly country – the People's Republic of China." (1) 
 
Trade and geopolitics are key concerns in the bilateral relations between Russia 
and China, and both leaderships are committed to strengthening the Russia-
China axis. Their influence within the SCO reflects an effort to undermine U.S. 
influence, whether perceived or actual. During the SCO, both Russia and China 
called for the U.S. to set a deadline for withdrawal of its military bases in the 
region; Kyrgyzstan's president-elect and other Kyrgyz officials reiterated this call, 
 12 
no doubt under pressure from Russia and China. Other language emanating 
from the SCO criticized "outside interference in nations' internal affairs." (2) This 
referred, no doubt, to Western criticisms of Uzbek actions against demonstrators. 
Most recently, Moscow described the U.S. presence as "non-regional," which 
echoes official Iranian rhetoric against any Western presence in the Caspian Sea 
region. (3)  [For more on the SCO summit, please see Military Affairs below.] 
 
If U.S. influence should diminish in the Central Asian region, who would be the 
primary beneficiary? During their summit in June, Putin and Jintao claimed to 
have a joint philosophy, one that values the "cult of human dignity" over "human 
rights," a key Western value. In a joint document, the two leaders commented 
that "ideological, moral and cultural values are growing in importance in the world 
today" and stated that within the SCO, "security and economic development, yet 
also ideology, are important." (4)  An ideological, as well as a geopolitical 
alignment, could be very valuable for Russia in the short run, especially with 
trends showing China's continuing ascendancy in the international arena. In the 
long term however, Russia must realize that it will be overshadowed ultimately by 
this powerful neighbor who seemingly shares the "values necessary for 
tomorrow's world." (5) 
 
Continuing controversy: Moscow and Tehran 
Although Moscow continues to insist that cooperation with Tehran in the nuclear 
sphere is conditional on transparency of policies, respect of the IAEA and 
absence of a nuclear military program, it appears that Moscow also is seeking 
new opportunities for nuclear partnership. Russia's top nuclear official, Aleksandr 
Rumyantsev, head of Rosatom, stated on 29 June that Russia wanted to bid for 
contracts to build more nuclear reactors in Iran. This underscores Putin's remarks 
that Russia would continue its nuclear cooperation with Iran under its new 
presidential leadership. (6)  As Moscow increases its ties to Tehran, it will have to 
deal not only with U.S. objections but with the possible repercussions of having 




During the recent G-8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, President Putin assured 
his G-8 partners that Russia will do everything possible to ensure stable energy 
supplies. (7)  This involves a series of proposed pipelines that are projected to 
increase natural gas supplies to 40 billion cubic meters by 2010. This includes a 
pipeline to the Far East, from Siberia to the Pacific, one from Siberia to the White 
Sea to serve the U.S., and a Baltic pipeline that would serve both the U.S. and 
Europe. (8)  The next G-8 will be held in St. Petersburg, and already Putin has 
stated that the primary issues will be energy, security and education. In a recent 
press briefing, Putin even invoked a higher power in connection to his energy 
policies: "It was God's will to make [this] country the leader of the market for 
natural gas, oil and nuclear energy, and to make this the main theme." (9) 
 
Providential or not, energy will be not only a topic for next year's summit but also 
for the "trilateral commission" meeting of Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran, which will 
take place 19-21 July. The current agenda focuses on cooperation among the 
countries' respective energy systems, with the goal of uniting the energy systems 
of Europe and Asia. (10)  The commission first met in Tehran in late 2004. 
 
Energy was also discussed during President Putin's recent meeting with Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Erdogan in Sochi, the fourth such gathering to take place 
in the last seven months. Economic interaction and energy issues topped the list, 
as the two leaders continue seeking ways to develop further cooperation. The 
Black Sea pipeline as a means to bring natural gas to Turkey, a possible 
underground gas storage reservoir on Turkish territory and joint efforts to bring 
electricity to Iraq were all covered by the leaders. (11)  Russia also continues to 
encourage a settlement between Turkey and Greek Cyprus; Putin reiterated his 
support of the United Nations Secretary General's approach to the problem. (12) 
 
Aliens in the European Parliament 
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The dispute continues within Japan and Russia over the Japanese Northern 
Territories, the islands of the Kuril archipelago. However, this time discussion 
was initiated by the European Parliament, which recently demanded that Russian 
return the Northern Territories to Japan. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded 
by saying this demand was "absurd," and Vladimir Chizkov, Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister, added, "The European Parliament seems to be living on 




(1) Interfax, 15 Jul 05 via Johnson's Russia List (JRL), #9201 
(www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9201-30.cfm). 
(2) "Russia Rejects U.S. Accusations of Bullying Central Asia" 
(www.crosswalk.com/news/1340815.html). 
(3) "Moscow Hardens Tone to Washington on Central Asia," Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, 19 Jul 05, vol. 2, issue 139 (www.jamestown.org). 
(4) RIA Novosti, 30 Jun 05 via JRL #9188 (www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9188-
32.cfm). 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) "Iranian Nuclear Team in Moscow Seeking New Partnerships," Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, 12 Jul 05, vol.2, issue 134 (www.jamestown.org). 
(7) RIA Novosti, 8 Jul 05, 10:00 (GMT) via 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050708/40868273.html. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) RIA Novosti, 8 Jul 05, 21:40 (GMT) via 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050708/40874946.html. 
(10) RIA Novosti, 19 Jul 05, 19:05 (GMT) via 
http://en.rian.ru/business/20050718/40928209.html. 
(11) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 18 Jul 05, Press 
Statement Following Russian-Turkish Talks via www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/english. 
(12) Ibid. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Power outages 
Anatoli Chubais, erstwhile reformer and CEO of Unified Energy Systems of 
Russia (RAO-UES), came under severe criticism because of the power outage 
that swept Moscow and several neighboring regions on May 24 and 25. The 
outage affected at least four million persons, with 20,000 stranded inside metro 
trains and 1500 caught in elevators. In the Tula region, outages reached 90 
percent of consumption volume. (1) 
 
In his 4 June address to the Security Council, Putin ruled out financial hardship 
as the cause of the outage. He cited RAO-UES's net profit of 55 billion rubles last 
year and questioned how the company was spending this money. (2) 
 
Putin criticized Mosenergo, the company responsible for operating the Moscow 
city and region power grids. Mosenergo executives called for a substantial hike in 
fees following the power failures. Putin's response? "This looks like sheer 
blackmail in a pursuit of corporate interests at the expense of customers, or the 
whole society, in fact." (3) 
 
Putin also emphasized the need for executives within RAO-UES who are not 
merely good economists, clever administrators, or real estate aficionados. 
Instead, he called for personnel that "understand[s] the role of a small screw in 
the country's vast energy system...[and is] able to identify on time the problem 
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with a dirt-cheap transformer and to foresee the havoc its improper maintenance 
may produce." His comments were hardly profound or original, but apparently 
necessary, given that wear and tear on the machines is thought to be the culprit 
behind the outages. Putin cited several problems within the current energy 
system, concluding, "All of it testifies to problematic management." (4) 
 
Given this criticism from the chief executive, it is scarcely surprising that there 
were calls for Chubais' removal. On 27 May, the Duma refused to include on its 
agenda a bill calling for Chubais' resignation put forward by 90 deputies, primarily 
from the nationalistic Rodina (Motherland) bloc, although it did not eliminate the 
possibility of a parliamentary inquiry at the time. In a 28 May interview on (at that 
time) RAO-UES-owned REN-TV, Chubais refused to step down as head of RAO-
UES because of the protests staged by the Communist, Yabloko and Rodina 
parties. He went on to accuse Rodina of masterminding the attempt on his life 
that occurred on March 17. (5) 
 
The hubbub resulted in a parliamentary investigation, which declared Chubais 
free of responsibility for the power failures. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzkhov attacked 
the investigation, declaring that any investigation that found Chubais not 
responsible was not an "objective" investigation. (6)  The investigation has lead 
to inquiries about the salaries of UES executives and top management. (7)  The 
Rodina (Motherland) bloc requested Chubais' removal but was defeated. The 
Communist party, ever one to seize an opportunity, staged a protest on 7 June 
that called for Chubais' resignation. (8) 
 
Chubais has said that obsolete equipment and employee mistakes were 
responsible for the problems at Moscow's Chagino electrical sub-station. UES 
has stated that it will provide compensation for all legally demonstrable damages 




Izvestiya, formerly owned by Vladimir Potanin's company Prof-Media, is being 
bought by the state-owned Gazprom Media Holding Company. Some critics 
allege that this purchase constitutes the state's move toward controlling 
newspapers in the same way that it currently controls the television market. For 
example, the television channel NTV, renowned for its unflinching coverage of 
the first Chechen war, was another media source to "benefit" from Gazprom 
ownership. Gazprom acquired a controlling stake in NTV in 2001 and 
subsequently altered the station's hitherto independent programming. The 
changes were accompanied by high staff turnover. Similar changes in editorial 
staff are widely predicted for Izvestiya following the completion of the Gazprom 
takeover.  
 
Kommersant, a newspaper owned by exiled Boris Berezovsky, is experiencing a 
shake-up in its editorial staff. General Director Andrei Vasilyev and chief editor 
Aleksandr Stukalin are being replaced, according to Berezovsky. 
 
UES-RAO has sold its 70 percent controlling interest in REN-TV, but the new 
owners are not what was expected. Yevrofinans Bank had been negotiating to 
purchase REN-TV for several years. That deal apparently was shoved aside, 
however, as UES-RAO, in the name of divesting itself of "non-core assets," sold 
its stake for $100 million to Severstal-Group. The remaining 30 percent stake, 
held by the president and general director, was sold to RTL Group, a subsidiary 
of Bertelsmann AG. The current President Irena Lesnevskaya and General 
Director Dmitri Lesnevsky announced to staff members that they would stay on 
for a transitional period. It remains to be seen how brief that transition will be. 
(10) 
 
North Ossetia president resigns 
Aleksandr Dzasokhov, the former President of North Ossetia, has taken a 
position as North Ossetia's representative for the Federation Council. Taimuraz 
Mamsurov, the region's parliamentary speaker, succeeded Dzasokhov as the 
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region's leader. Dzasokhov has been under intense domestic pressure since the 
terrorist attack in Beslan, North Ossetia, in September. At the time, he attempted 
to divert attention from himself by dismissing his entire ministerial staff. The 
continued pressure from his constituents has made Dzasokhov a political liability. 
Technically he is removing himself from office, however the Kremlin was almost 
certainly involved in the decision. 
 
Union of Right Forces update 
The newly-elected head of the democratic party Union of Right Forces (SPS), 
Nikita Belykh, faces the challenge of making SPS electorally viable. He stressed 
in a 30 May interview that SPS is operating on a timeline that threatens to reduce 
its effectiveness if it does not compete successfully in the next parliamentary 
elections. "I for one understand clearly that if we fail to secure a convincing 
victory at the 2007 elections, it will be very difficult for us to talk about prospects 
for the following five or 10 years," said the new leader. (11) 
 
Belykh anticipates soliciting funding from medium-sized businesses (a sector that 
is notoriously underdeveloped in Russia), theorizing that those entities are more 
likely to be interested in politics at the regional level. Among the challenges SPS 
faces are a lack of unified and well-organized support in the regions; Belyk 
admitted that links between regional branches of SPS are weak, as are 
connections between the regions and the party's central organization. (12) 
 
New head of press service 
Yevgeni Revenko, first deputy director of the government press service and 
former host of NTV's Vesti Nedeli, has been appointed deputy director of the 
department of mass communications, the media, culture and education as well 
as head of the press service.  According to Revenko's boss, Denis Molchanov, 
one of Revenko's primary responsibility's will be "developing and conducting 
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The battle for Central Asian security 
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On July 5, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its first summit 
since the Kyrgyz revolution and the suppressed uprising in Uzbekistan's city of 
Andijan. The presidents of all member countries, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, took part with observers from Mongolia, 
Iran, India and Pakistan.  Their joint declaration called for coalition forces to set a 
date for leaving Central Asia.  
 
Currently, Uzbekistan hosts approximately 800 U.S. troops at the Karshi-
Khanabad (K2) airbase.  Kyrgyzstan is home to about 1200 coalition forces 
located at the Manas airport, while approximately 200 French Air Force troops 
are stationed at the Dushanbe airport in Tajikistan.  
 
The SCO joint declaration reiterated the principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference.  
These concepts have formed the basis of China's "New Security Concept" since 
they were introduced by then Premier Zhou Enlai at the 1955 Bandung 
Conference and have been included in other SCO declarations.  Additionally the 
declaration indirectly criticized the U.S. stance on democracy, saying that it is the 
"countries' right independently to choose ways of development based on their 
specific characteristics." (1)  In post summit press conferences, most SCO 
member presidents highlighted this element rather than the call for coalition troop 
withdrawal.  Chinese leader Hu Jintao said "the fate of Central Asian countries is 
in their own hands and they are wise and capable enough to sort out their 
domestic problems on their own." (2) 
 
In regard to the coalition troops, the SCO declaration specifically stated, 
"Considering that the active combat phase of the anti-terrorist operation in 
Afghanistan has been completed, the SCO members deem necessary that the 
coalition countries involved should set the final dates for their temporary use of 
those infrastructure installations and stationing of their troops on SCO member 
countries' territories." (3)  The SCO assessment of Afghanistan's security 
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situation seems politically, rather than militarily, based, since this year has been 
the costliest for U.S. forces in Afghanistan since the start of combat operations in 
2001.  Thirty-five U.S. military personnel have been killed in the increasing 
violence leading up to Afghanistan's parliamentary elections in September. (4)  
On 28 June 2005, a U.S. helicopter providing support for a U.S. Special Forces 
reconnaissance team was shot down, killing all sixteen personnel onboard.  
Three members of the four-man team were also killed in the same battle.  The 
losses were the heaviest in a single combat incident for U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan since 2001.  
 
The assessment also represents a fundamental change in Moscow's position. In 
late June, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 
that "We [Russia] know that the single-minded and plan-based training of 
terrorists for their future export continues in Afghanistan at this time. The recent 
events in Uzbekistan are graphic evidence of this. We have sufficiently reliable 
information that all that occurred in Andijan was inspired from the territory of 
Afghanistan. A group of armed militants of Islamist organizations, the Taliban 
included, had long been preparing an invasion of Uzbekistan." (5)  Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov echoed this claim in late June.  At the same NRC 
meeting, Defense Minister Ivanov alleged that the situation in Afghanistan 
currently is not significantly better than it was under Taliban rule, and that the 
operation had not yet approached the "culminating phase." (6)  
 
Coalition Response 
The United States immediately rejected the proposal to set a deadline for troop 
withdrawal.  U.S. State Department spokesman Scott McCormack told reporters 
that the military presence in the region "is determined by bilateral agreements, 
under which both counties have concluded that there is a benefit to both sides 
from our activities." (7)  U.S. Defense Department spokesman Lawrence Di Rita 
said that regarding the base in Uzbekistan, "It's a decision the Uzbek government 
has to make as to whether or not we would continue to operate from that." (8) 
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The French military attaché in Tajikistan commented to Interfax that "the situation 
in Afghanistan is far from being ideal despite certain democratic changes, 
including the parliamentary elections." (9)  He added, "France does not seek 
domination in Central Asia. NATO does not think that the CSTO is an enemy, 
and the CSTO should feel the same."(10) 
 
Political convergence 
While not an ultimatum, the declaration represents a convergence of interests of 
all SCO member countries.  In the wake of the allegedly Western-sponsored 
Kyrgyz revolution, the uprising in Andijan in May and Western requests for an 
outside investigation, it has become clear to Central Asian countries that their 
multi-vectored foreign policy may no longer be an option.  Their "all 
encompassing" definition of counter terrorism is significantly different than the 
Western definition.  The once muted Western criticisms of human rights abuses 
and limited political participation in Central Asia are now mounting.  With the 
Kyrgyz Revolution still fresh in their minds, the Central Asian leaders do not see 
this as a time to embrace democracy or human rights.  Uzbekistan President 
Islam Karimov said some outside forces were joining radical Islamists "to create 
instability and undermine the region economically in order to impose their own 
development model." (11) 
 
Russia would also like to see an end to the western military presence in Central 
Asia.  Moscow has lost influence in other post-Soviet regions due, in part, to the 
"color revolutions" and does not want to see that trend continue.  Russia has 
made several political and military maneuvers to strengthen its influence in 
Central Asia since the deployment of U.S. forces into the region:  It opened Kant 
Airbase in Kyrgyzstan in October 2003; resolved the basing issue for the 201st 
Motorized Rifle Division; and established a new permanent base in Tajikistan.  
Russia also established a Collective Rapid Deployment Force in Central Asia 
based on forces in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the legislature passed 
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increasing incentives for bilateral relations with Central Asian countries.  
Apparently, this SCO declaration represents the next logical step for Russia. 
 
China does not want to see an ongoing Western military presence in Central 
Asia; it is interested in assuring its own influence in the region in order to utilize 
the major oil and gas resources in the future.  China also is looking to strengthen 
the security apparatus of the SCO, where it has a significant voice. 
 
Potential versus reality 
While considering the security aspects of this summit, the question lingers as to 
whether the SCO could, or would, fill the U.S.'s military position in the event of a 
coalition withdrawal.  Iran, India and Pakistan joined the SCO as observers.  If 
they become full-fledged members, the group will represent half the world's 
population, which suggests its significant potential, at least quantitatively. 
 
Mohammed Khoshchehreh, an adviser to Iranian president-elect Mahmud 
Ahmadinezhad, said on 8 July, "the Shanghai Cooperation Organization may 
become stronger militarily than NATO." (12)  On 14 July, Duma Deputy Speaker 
and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovsky 
proposed transforming the SCO into a military alliance that could be "a 
counterweight to NATO."  "In 10 years, an allied army of such an alliance will 
have both a qualitative and quantitative edge over NATO," he projected. (13)  
The president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, Leonid Ivashov, went 
even further saying that, "at this stage the SCO is fully able to assume 
responsibility for security in this area". (14) 
 
The deputy director of the Strategic Research Center in Tajikistan, Sayfullo 
Safarov, offered a differing view.  On 7 July, he said that "the pace of mutual 
cooperation between the SCO member states would not enable them to counter 
international terrorism and the increasing flow of drugs on their own. ... Moreover, 
the latest events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have shown that the SCO and 
 24 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization member-states lack effectiveness 
and precision in tackling military and political issues. I am therefore ready to say 
that it is premature to impose such requirements on the U.S. and NATO military, 
because the SCO member states have not created appropriate conditions for 
maintaining security in the Central Asia region." (15)  Safarov believes that no 
one can guarantee the Central Asian states protection against the drug and arms 
trades, human trafficking and the infiltration of religious and extremist 
organizations into the Central Asian states. 
 
The SCO's future position in Central Asia also may depend on member country 
ideas about military forces and security.  At the G8 summit, President Putin 
stressed that the SCO was not a military bloc.  He added that all practical military 
issues in Central Asia were considered in the format of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization. (16) 
 
Russian Deputy Defense Minister Sergei Razov said, "Military cooperation does 
not rank among the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's priorities." (17) 
 
Conclusion 
The Central Asian authoritarian governments' inclination to resolve domestic 
political problems under the guise of combating terrorism will only lead to more 
harsh criticism from the West.  Whether this criticism will lead eventually to the 
end of U.S. forces in the region remains to be seen.  The Central Asian 
governments will continue to find open arms and loud support from both China 
and Russia, but it is questionable whether this verbal support will translate into 
tangible security or even military action.  
 
Coalition forces brought down the Taliban, marginalized the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan, killed its leader Dzhuma Namangani, and established a secular 
regime in Afghanistan.  Neither China nor Russia is capable of achieving that 
level of success with its current force structure.  Neither the SCO nor CSTO has 
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resources in the Central Asian theater to reliably defend borders against Islamic 
extremist incursions.  Moscow and Beijing always appear to Central Asian 
leaders as far more palatable security options than Washington or Brussels, due, 
in part, to the Western push for democratic and market-oriented reforms.  
Therefore, the SCO member countries' desire to maintain the political status quo 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
Yushchenko undercutting Moldova in Transnistria? 
On 15 July, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko met with the self-proclaimed 
leader of the separatist republic of Transnistria, juridically part of Moldova.  
Following the talks, Yushchenko's press office released a glowing review of the 
meeting.  "The parties agreed to act conjointly to settle the Transdniester 
conflict," the communiqué said. Further, the president's press service noted, "Mr. 
Smirnov fully supported Ukraine's action plan [to end the separatist conflict]," and 
"said it was the first time this topic was discussed professionally."  (1) 
 
Mr. Yushchenko's Moldovan counterpart, President Vladimir Voronin, could not 
have been pleased.  This private meeting with Yushchenko provides Smirnov 
with a sheen of legitimacy repeatedly rejected both by Moldova and the 
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international community.  To date, the only other head of state who has met 
individually with Smirnov is Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose tacit support 
for the separatist republic has been criticized by everyone from Moldovan 
officials to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and 
to the Council of Europe.   
 
But not by Yushchenko.  Apparently, during his meeting, Yushchenko shied away 
from the topic of Russian troops on Transnistrian territory.  The country 
reportedly still maintains between 1,300 to 2,000 troops and a significant 
stockpile of ammunition and armaments in the separatist enclave, and has made 
no attempt to live up to previously signed international agreements to withdraw.  
 
Instead, Russia has renamed its troops "peacekeepers," and claimed that they 
are there to stabilize the situation in the enclave.  Moldova, however, claims that 
the troops do little more than prop up Smirnov's administration, while facilitating 
smuggling of goods and women between Eastern Europe and the West.  Human 
rights organizations and the OSCE have generally supported Moldova's 
contentions on this issue, particularly regarding what has become known as the 
Transnistrian "black hole" of smuggling.  In fact, the region has developed such a 
reputation for smuggling that the Economist recently referred to Transnistria as "a 
big, ugly smuggling racket with a piece of land attached." (2)  Yushchenko does 
not appear to have spent considerable time in his meeting with Smirnov on this 
issue, however, judging from Smirnov's support following their talks. 
 
The meeting between Smirnov and Yushchenko came at a time when tensions 
over the status of Transnistria are particularly high.   Just days before his warm 
meeting with Yushchenko, Smirnov announced that he had approved the 
creation of a "public militia," organized "for the purpose of cooperating with the 
Transdniester Armed Forces in state defense."  At the same time, Smirnov asked 
Russia to increase the number of its troops within the territory to 2,400.   These 
moves were necessary, he said, because of possible "provocations from 
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Moldova."  During the same interview, Smirnov reiterated that Transnistria "won't 
become a part of Moldova, and such a variant is excluded." (3) 
 
One wonders then to what Smirnov agreed during his meeting just days later with 
Yushchenko.  
 
While most observers welcomed Yushchenko's initiative to jumpstart talks that 
have been stalled since 2003, the president's plan seems unlikely to resolve the 
frozen conflict and may even exacerbate the situation by angering both Romania 
and Moldova.  In fact, since the plan's public unveiling, Moldova's position has 
hardened considerably.  The country's leadership reportedly is concerned that 
Ukraine's plan may lead to the de facto partition of the country with permanent 
intervention in Moldova both by Russia and Ukraine.  
 
Moldovan officials express particular concern about the absence in the plan of a 
requirement that Russia's troops be withdrawn from Moldovan territory.  
Moldova's stated position is that there can be no settlement of the Transnistrian 
issue until these troops are removed. Yet, this point is passed over in Ukraine's 
plan, which instead calls for a vague "internationalization" of "peacekeeping" 
operations.   
 
Additionally, Ukraine's proposal would allow Transnistrian officials to have input 
into, and perhaps veto power over, international agreements signed by Moldova.  
Moldovan officials fear that this would forever end their goal of joining both NATO 
and the E.U., since Tiraspol is ardently opposed to both ideas.   
 
The plan also calls for Transnistria's status within Moldova to be determined by 
this fall, with "Elections to be held soon to Transnistria's Supreme Soviet, the 
representative body of the Transnistria region of Moldova, on the basis of a legal 
status of Transnistria."  (4)  National Security and Defense Council Secretary 
Petro Poroshenko, the man who drafted Ukraine's plan, has suggested that such 
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elections could be held as soon as November of this year, conveniently 
overlooking the fact that there is no internationally accepted legal basis for them. 
Tellingly, Smirnov eagerly agreed to these elections.  He has already invited 
"international observers" to monitor the poll, which as yet has no set date. (5) 
 
Moldova has reacted strongly to the idea of quick elections within Transnistria.  In 
its response to Ukraine's suggestion, Moldova's parliament wrote, "It is 
impossible to conduct free and democratic elections in the Transnistrian region, 
given that the Moldovan constitution's norms and international democratic 
standards are not observed, that political pluralism and freedom of speech is 
missing, and heterodox beliefs are repressed."  (6)   
 
Moldovan officials rightly suggest that, should an election be held in this type of 
environment, it runs the risk of legitimizing an entrenched authoritarian regime, 
blunting international pressure on Smirnov (who would be the recognized elected 
leader), and freezing the Transnistrian conflict for years.  Alternatively, should the 
election not be recognized as valid by international observers, Smirnov would be 
given yet another pretext to reject future international cooperation. 
 
Yushchenko himself should be intimately aware of how elections are conducted 
in Transnistria, thanks to seven polling stations set up for Ukrainian citizens 
during the recent Ukrainian presidential election.  Oksana Bilozir, the godmother 
of Yushchenko's children and the current Minister of Culture, served as a 
coordinator of monitors in Transnistria.  She returned to Kyiv with a litany of 
complaints.  
 
She said, "We anticipated the possibility of rigging, which is why we sent two 
journalists and one foreign observer to each polling station.  All cars were 
stopped, people were arrested, video cameras with which they were supposed to 
record violations were broken.  Journalist Klebanskyy was deported within on 
hour, and when he crossed the Ukrainian border he was followed by the warning 
 30 
that he would be killed if he decided to come back."  Bilozir also reported that the 
head of the Dniester Ukrainian Association, who was serving as an official 
Yushchenko observer, was severely beaten by being kicked in the face, while 
numerous other observers were detained and deported.  (7) 
 
Yushchenko's plan has spurred a barrage activity within international 
organizations involved in the issue.  Most of the activity has angered Moldovan 
officials, as—like Ukraine's plan—it has often occurred without consulting them.  
 
On July 7, the country's representatives walked out of a meeting of the 
parliamentary assembly of the OSCE after a resolution on the issue failed to refer 
to Transnistrian representatives as "separatists."  According to Christian 
Democratic Party Leader Iurie Rosca, the resolution "put at equal terms 
Chisinau's legal authorities and the criminal Transnistrian separatist regime."  (8) 
Officials also responded angrily when the OSCE resolution did not predicate 
Transnistrian elections on the withdrawal of Russian troops and the eradication 
of Transnistria's intimidating and omnipresent secret services.   After the 
meeting, Moldovan officials were said to be concerned that the OSCE seemed 
more responsive to Russia's suggestion of a federalized Moldova with Russian 
troop presence since the Yushchenko plan was released. (9) 
 
On June 9, Moldova's parliament overwhelmingly passed a package of 
documents in response to Yushchenko's plan.  Although the documents 
diplomatically state that the parliament "highly appreciates Ukraine's offer," they 
clearly do not embrace the main tenets of the plan.  The parliament states clearly 
that it is in support of future elections in Transnistria, but in exchange, demands 
the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria by the end of 2005.  (10) 
 
Here, Moldova may be attempting to emulate the tactic used by Georgia in 
forcing Russia to promise to withdraw its troops.  However, because Russia 
provides virtually free energy directly to Transnistria and because the enclave 
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can procure its supplies through illicit channels, Moldova has less leverage over 
its separatist republic than Georgia has over its own separatists.  As such, 
Moldova's demand is likely to be dismissed.  
 
In June, Voronin traveled to Strasbourg for talks on implementation of the new 
E.U.-Moldova Action Plan, and asked for assistance in removing Russian troops 
from his country's territory.  ""Russian troops have no official status. They are in 
the territory of the republic of Moldova illegally," he said.  (11)  He reiterated the 
position in July.  "We can't see any political or geopolitical reasons for the 
presence of Russian troops on the territory of Moldova," he said.  "The place of 
troops in the security zone in Moldova must be occupied by observers, acting 
under an international mandate."  (12) 
 
Since Yushchenko's plan was released, most international organizations have 
responded gingerly such requests for assistance. Although the E.U. has agreed 
to assist minimally in the monitoring of a portion of the Transnistrian border, a 
large-scale mission by the E.U. or OSCE seems unlikely. The E.U. has shied 
away from such large-scale bordering missions in the past, and the OSCE 
bureaucratic system means it would need Russian support for such an idea. It 
appears that the international community may be collectively sighing with relief 
that Ukraine has taken over leadership on this thorny issue, and are happy to 
allow the country to do so. Discussions are continuing over whether the E.U. and 
the US will participate in talks over the situation, as Yushchenko has suggested, 
and Smirnov reportedly has agreed. Indications at the moment are that they will 
not. 
 
Yushchenko must know, however, that Chisinau will never—perhaps politically 
can never—agree to his plan as proposed, and as accepted by Smirnov and 
Russia.  Yet, the plan was announced, placing Yushchenko's supposed ally 
Voronin in an awkward and difficult position.  So then, what is the purpose of this 
plan?  Was this a carrot to Russia, which has announced its wholehearted 
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support?  Perhaps it was a bone to the Donbass business entities that are said to 
profit from the Transnistrian smuggling trade?  Or perhaps Yushchenko truly 
believed that this plan was the best option. 
 
Moldovan newspapers, rallying around their president, have suggested that the 
plan was designed to benefit businessmen surrounding Yushchenko – in 
particular Poroshenko, who, Flux claimed, "has business interests in the Dniester 
region."  (13)  While not impossible, this claim seems questionable. But, it clearly 
demonstrates the emotional and unyielding response of many in Moldova to 
Yushchenko's proposals.  Unfortunately for the Ukrainian president, the almost 
unanimous response to his plan within Moldova has been to unite against it. 
 
Regardless of why the plan was offered, the dynamic of the Transnistria conflict 
has changed as a result.  Is it any surprise, then, why Igor Smirnov was so happy 
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KYRGYZSTAN 
Kyrgyz elections: arise President Bakiev 
Almost three months ago, in what amounted to a popular rebellion rather than an 
organized revolution, the government of President Askar Akaev collapsed. Ten 
days ago, on 10 July, elections to choose a new President were finally held in the 
Kyrgyz republic.      
 
In the immediate aftermath of the rebellion, the Kyrgyz Parliament appointed an 
interim government consisting of Former Interior Minister Feliks Kulov, opposition 
leader Kurmanbek Bakiev and former Foreign Minister Rosa Otunbayeva. (1) 
The Parliament's leadership selection was an extremely prescient move based 
on the situation in the country at the time. Many of the demonstrations against 
Akaev had started and been at their strongest in the Southern regions, especially 
in Bakiev's strongholds of Osh and Jalalabad; Kulov's center of support lies in the 
North, around the capital Bishkek. As such, the new leadership served to provide 
an image of national unity. 
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Initially, it seemed that both Bakiev and Kulov would stand for the Presidency. 
Bakiev announced his own candidacy within days of the creation of the interim 
government, while Kulov came forward somewhat later—having been forced to 
wait until the Supreme Court nullified the charges levied against him by the 
Akaev regime. (2) The prospect of a potentially (nationally) divisive Presidential 
race was averted on 13 May, when Kulov announced his withdrawal from the 
campaign. Under the terms of an agreement reached with Bakiev, Kulov was 
appointed Acting First Deputy Prime Minister, and guaranteed the post of Prime 
Minister—with increased powers of appointment—in the event of a Bakiev 
electoral victory. (3) It is important to note that the Bakiev-Kulov alliance also was 
geared towards the broader regional situation, namely the unrest in Uzbekistan, 
and its potential effects on Kyrgyzstan through that country's considerable Uzbek 
minority. (4) 
 
The "interregnum" period in Kyrgyzstan has not been entirely peaceful. The 
country has witnessed several high profile murders, including those of Usen 
Kudaibergenov (a film director and ally of Kulov) and Member of Parliament 
Jyrgalbek Surabaldiev. There have been several attacks on Bakiev's campaign 
headquarters by opponents (5), while on 17th June, after several days of 
protests, demonstrators stormed the Parliament building in Bishkek to protest the 
exclusion of Urmatbek Baryktabasov from the election. Apparently, authorities 
discovered that Baryktabasov holds Kazakh not Kyrgyz citizenship, a fact which, 
if true, would provide legitimate grounds for exclusion. (6) Of deeper concern to 
authorities—if the allegations are proven—is that an investigative reporter claims 
to have discovered that Baryktabasov, a close friend and ally of former President 
Akaev, may have been using funds funneled by the latter to pay protestors to 
disrupt the electoral process. (7) In any event, the interim government was quick 
to re-take the Parliament building, ordering some 1,000 riot police officers to the 
scene to clear the building. Reports indicate that law enforcement officers were 
armed only with riot shields and batons, not firearms, and that the protestors 
were flushed from the building with teargas. (8) The fact that police officers were 
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only lightly armed may indicate that the government had decided to minimize 
violence as much as possible in the run up to the polls. 
 
The registration of candidates for the election officially ended on 7 June. By the 
end of the day, a total of seven candidates had accumulated the required 50,000 
signatures. Bakiev's main competitors were: Zhusupbek Sharipov (former 
governor of Jalalabad), Tursunbay Bakir-uulu (former Kyrgyz Ombudsman), 
Keneshbek Dushebayev (former Interior Minister), Akbaraly Aitikeev, Jypar 
Jeksheev and one female, Toktayym Umetalieva. (9) 
 
Campaigning for the polls officially began on 14 June, and ended a day before 
the election, on 9 July. (10)  In the week since the polls, the OSCE has released 
its preliminary observations of the election. Compared to previous election 
reports, on Kyrgyz and other Central Asian elections, this report was quite 
favorable. The OSCE noted that: campaigning had been free of government 
interference; there had been a real exchange of ideas between candidates during 
live televised debates; the Central Election Commission had, at the very least, 
attempted to show impartiality by moving out of Government House for the 
duration of the process; freedom of congregation and expression were respected 
throughout the process and finally, the government had taken account of the 
considerable Uzbek minority by having the debates broadcast with Uzbek 
language dubbing in the Southern part of the country. (11) 
 
According to the preliminary results issued by the CEC, voter turnout reached 
record levels with 74.6% of the country's population voting. (12) Bakiev 
reportedly received 88.9% of the vote, with the second placed candidate, 
Tursunbay Bakir-uulu receiving just under 4%. (13) The OSCE did note some 
irregularities during the election, including an inflation of the turnout figures. 
These irregularities likely served to inflate Bakiev's poll numbers to their reported 
levels. It should be noted however, that the OSCE believes that Bakiev would still 
have carried the election by a considerable margin without turnout inflation. (14) 
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The improvements in Kyrgyzstan also have been noted internationally, with the 
U.S. State Department praising a "calm and peaceful" vote and noting that 
Kyrgyzstan had made "tangible progress" towards meeting OSCE and other 
international commitments." (15) 
 
Bakiev's first action as President-elect was to sign a decree in line with their 
agreement, appointing Kulov as Acting Deputy Premier. Kulov is expected to 
become Prime Minister when Bakiev officially is inaugurated President—probably 
early next month. (16) A cabinet has not yet been formed, and the government 
has not made any serious policy decisions, save to state (as a participant in the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization's recent joint declaration) that it requires 
clarification from Washington on a timetable for closure of the U.S. base near 
Bishkek. (17) It is important to note that the Kyrgyz government has not indicated 
that it wishes to end its cooperative relationship with the United States. On a 
recent visit to the U.S., Acting Foreign Minister Otunbayeva stated that 
Kyrgyzstan wished to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries 
(18), while also noting that Russia remains an "important strategic ally" to the 
Republic. (19) These statements would seem to indicate that the new Kyrgyz 
government will seek to assess each policy anew—on its merits and 
weaknesses, rather than simply to continue the policies of its predecessor 




Throughout early May, protests—largely peaceful in nature—had been occurring 
in the Uzbek town of Andijan. The demonstrations were held to protest the 
innocence of several local men held on charges of membership in Islamic 
extremist groups. On 12 May, large crowds began to gather in the center of 
Andijan, calling for President Karimov's resignation, as well as railing against the 
government's economic policies, which keep a large percentage of the rural 
population languishing in extreme poverty. (20) 
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Throughout the day, government forces were observed moving into position 
around the town's central square, effectively sealing the protestors into a 
"controllable" area.  Early on the morning of 13 May, these troops began firing 
indiscriminately into the crowds, making no attempt to separate innocent 
bystanders from protestors. As the crowds tried to exit the square, troops moving 
in vehicles pursued them, firing as they moved. (21) In a new detail documented 
by the OSCE in its report of the incident, evidence emerged that witnesses had 
spotted snipers on rooftops, using high powered rifles to kill victims missed by 
the roving troops. (22) The troops involved apparently were Special Forces Units 
(Bars & Skorpion) belonging to the Interior Ministry. (23)  The day after the forced 
dispersal of the demonstrators, government forces initiated a massive cleanup 
operation, moving bodies to mass graves in the environs of the town. 
 
President Karimov's immediate assertion during a press conference on the 
morning of 14 May was that the demonstrations had been orchestrated by 
Islamic extremists, linked to the Taliban in Afghanistan, for evidence of which he 
cited "recorded" telephone conversations between the "terrorists" and their 
controllers. (24) 
 
Since the Andijan incident, the Uzbek government has stuck to its story. The 
Uzbek Prosecutor General's office announced that an investigation had 
"established" that Hizb-ut-Tahir had sent "armed" and "trained" detachments 
numbering some twenty people into Andijan with the specific goal of causing 
unrest and violence. (25) The official Uzbek version of events has been 
supported by the Russian government. On 29 June, Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov stated during a meeting that Russian intelligence had known of the 




As is to be expected, the regime in Uzbekistan is using events in Andijan as an 
excuse for a broader crackdown. Reports from various sources indicate that 
multiple Uzbek human rights activists, including those working for foreign 
organizations (such as the London based Institute for War and Peace Reporting), 
and journalists have disappeared, been publicly arrested or are subject to visible 
surveillance and harassment by the Secret Services. (27) 
 
Karimov's assertions regarding the incident in Andijan have been the target of 
some skepticism internationally. As a result, several world leaders, including 
President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, have attempted to persuade the 
Uzbek President to allow an independent international investigation. (28)  Senior 
legislators from the United States have added their voices to pressure Karimov, 
notably Senator John McCain, who in an Op-Ed piece in the Financial Times, 
urged reform and an investigation. (29) Karimov—with Russia's support—has 
flatly rejected the possibility of an inquiry. 
 
The Uzbek President's behaviour since Andijan could be described as somewhat 
schizophrenic. On the one hand, Karimov has rejected calls for an independent 
investigation; he is apparently the prime force behind the SCO's request for a 
timetable of U.S. base closures in Central Asia (30), and has intimated, 
conspiratorially, that Western journalists were secretly in Andijan prior to the 
protests, in order to give negative coverage to the regime's response. (31) On the 
other hand Karimov has issued an invitation for any members of the U.S. 
Congress or human rights activists who "spoke about the Andijan tragedy so 
unceremoniously" to attend the trial, (32) promising that it will be "open" and fair. 
(33) Clearly, such "promises" are designed to attempt to ensure that Uzbekistan 
remains a valued friend in the Global War on Terror—and as such, the recipient 
of millions of dollars in aid—while also  "preempting" what Karimov sees as 
"Western meddling" designed to provoke or foment a "color" revolution in 
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